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Anxiety is believed to have a disruptive effect on attentional control, supported by evidence of 
increased distractibility among high trait anxious individuals. However, how feelings of current 
anxious apprehension influence selective attention is less well-understood. The present study 
examined this by assessing attentional capture by a novel distractor within a visual search task. 
Participants searched an array of colored objects for a shape-defined target, while attempting 
to ignore a color singleton distractor presented on half of trials. To induce apprehension, 
participants completed the task in some blocks with a low probability threat of loud aversive 
sounds being presented. We found significantly increased distractibility within the threat 
condition when noise was anticipated but not played, as reflected by a larger distractor 
presence cost to reaction times. The finding that apprehension potentiates task-irrelevant 
attentional capture suggests a generalized role of anxious emotion in increasing distractibility. 
 





 High levels of anxiety are associated with a number of changes in cognitive function 
(e.g., Bishop, 2007). In particular, growing evidence suggests a link with alterations in selective 
attention processes. For example, individuals reporting high levels of dispositional anxiety in 
their daily life show a tendency for impoverished inhibition, such as in suppressing prepotent 
responses (Berggren & Derakshan, 2014; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010), or attentional capture 
by salient distractors (Moran & Moser, 2015). These findings can be accommodated within 
cognitive models such as the Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), which posit that 
anxiety has a deleterious effect on top-down attentional control, primarily evident in tasks that 
weight on core components of this process such as distractor inhibition.  
Given there is much evidence for a link between anxious traits and modulations to 
attentional control, it is tempting to assume that this could be driven by situational factors such 
as the mere feeling of anxiety and apprehension as an emotion. For instance, one candidate to 
explain anxiety-related deficits in inhibition is that high anxiety is associated with active worry, 
which could impair control through consuming limited-capacity working memory resources 
shared with executive attention processes (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007; see Engle, 2002). 
Alternatively, anxious feelings may promote vigilance to the visual environment to detect 
potential threats, increasing the likelihood of task-irrelevant distraction (Eysenck, 1992). In 
either case, any situational experience of anxious emotion would be expected to have similar 
effects on selective attention as observed in high trait anxiety. Surprisingly, however, 
investigation of the effect of acute anxiety or apprehension on attention has produced highly 
inconsistent results.  
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On the one hand, acute anxiety and apprehension, and more generally acute stress, has 
been found to reduce performance on a number of tasks assessing executive attention (Schoofs 
et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 2016), including increased distractibility in selective attention tasks 
such as the Stroop test (e.g., Choi et al., 2012; Starcke et al., 2016), and larger orienting effects 
towards task-irrelevant cues (Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). Conversely, a number of studies 
have reported contrary reduced distractibility, including in similar attention task paradigms 
(e.g., Stroop task: Booth, in press; Chajut & Algom, 2003; Henderson et al., 2012; Hu et al., 
2012), suggesting surprisingly improved attentional control. It is important to note that 
contradictory findings across studies may relate to the variety of induction methods utilized, as 
well as the experimental emphasis on examining anxiety to a presence of a direct threat, the 
apprehension of a forthcoming threat, or more general feelings of stress. For example, anxious 
apprehension has been induced through low probability threat of electric shock or aversive 
noise manipulations (Booth, in press; Choi et al., 2012; Henderson et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2012; 
Starcke et al., 2016), presentation of unpleasant images (Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010), or 
priming moods via movie clips (Finucane, 2011). Meanwhile, general stress has been induced 
through participants completing unpleasant activities such as immersion of an arm in ice-cold 
water (Beste et al., 2013), or employing a variety of priming methods simultaneously, such as 
time pressure, fatigue, and ego threat (Chajut & Algom, 2003). As a consequence, conflicting 
findings across studies could reflect differences in what is precisely being induced across 
different methodologies. Nevertheless, the fact a number of studies converge on findings 
suggesting improved attentional control under high state anxiety or apprehension poses a 
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major problem for any theoretical attempt to draw parallels between short- and long-term 
anxious experience in influencing selective attention.  
Why might acute anxious emotion improve attentional control? One classic account put 
forward by Easterbrook (1959) proposes that emotion reduces “cue utilization”, which can be 
conceptualized spatially as a narrowing of the breadth of attention or non-spatially as a 
reduction in the number of objects or basic feature attributes of a stimulus that are 
simultaneously attended to within the environment. This account encompasses the effect of 
negative emotionality in general, assuming that additional irrelevant signals are often the first 
to suffer when cue utilization is reduced, thereby accommodating the basic finding of reduced 
distractibility. On this account, attentional control is not improved under acute experience of 
anxious emotion per se, but rather distractor information incidentally suffers by receiving 
reduced attention, giving the impression of heightened control. While it should be noted that 
other evidence for Easterbrook’s account has come from visual perception studies (e.g., Bursill, 
1958), at the level of selective attention the majority of work highlighting reduced distractibility 
under anxious or stressful emotion as outlined above has emerged from variations on a single 
measure: distractibility via response-competition in classic Stroop or flanker tasks. Here, 
comparison is typically made between participants’ reaction time (RTs) when a response-
incongruent distractor attribute is present in a display (e.g., when responding to the color red 
overlaid on the irrelevant word blue) versus when a distractor attribute is response-congruent 
(e.g., red overlaid on the word red). The difference between RTs in these two conditions gives a 
reflection of to what extent a participant failed to ignore an irrelevant distractor’s input, with 
an increased cost score suggesting heightened distractibility.  
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A problem with response-competition paradigms, however, is that they can confound 
multiple facets of attention and cognition. For example, such paradigms also create motor 
conflict, where an incongruent distractor signal promotes a motor response that differs from a 
task-relevant signal. In relation to anxiety, there is evidence of influences to motor control, as 
for example acute apprehension of threat has been implicated in improving the withholding of 
prepotent responses in motor stopping tasks indicative of harm avoidance (Robinson et al., 
2013)1. Points such as this raise the possibility that findings of reduced distractibility when 
acutely experiencing anxiety and apprehension may reflect a phenomenon outside of selective 
attention per se. Consequently, it is important to examine whether or not such findings of 
reduced distractibility translate to more direct measures of selective attention that avoid 
potential issues surrounding response-competition.  
Here, we aimed to provide such a test of distractibility within a selective attention task. 
Participants were asked to search an array of colored shape objects for a target diamond item, 
responding whether a gray line presented within this shape was horizontally or vertically 
oriented. On half of trials, all items were presented in the same color (red or green). On the 
other half of trials, one non-target shape was presented in the opposite color (e.g., red among 
green items), thereby acting as a task-irrelevant singleton. Studies using this procedure have 
demonstrated that the inclusion of an additional singleton within search displays elicits task-
irrelevant attentional capture, disrupting speeded response to target objects (e.g., Theeuwes, 
                                                          
1 Note that such an effect in relation to response-competition may be specific to state inducements of 
anxiety; while there is evidence that chronically anxious individuals also show improvements in motor 
stopping (Grillon et al., 2017), response-competition as a marker of distractibility is often found to be 




1992). This paradigm has also been previously utilized to examine the role of trait anxiety in 
distractibility, which positively correlates with distractor costs (e.g., Moran & Moser, 2015). 
Importantly, this task does not include any element of response-competition; singleton 
distractors do not promote a motor response, merely acting to bias spatial attention and 
requiring suppression in order to efficiently respond to target objects (e.g., Sawaki & Luck, 
2010). With regard to anxious emotion, we examined the role of induced apprehension for a 
forthcoming threat, with participants undergoing two task conditions. Within ‘safe’ blocks, the 
task was completed as described above. Within ‘threat’ blocks, participants completed the task 
with the added manipulation that loud aversive sound was presented at low probability across 
trials. Threat of aversive stimuli manipulations are well-established to successfully induce 
apprehension (threat of loud noise: e.g., Booth, in press; threat of shock: e.g., Choi et al., 2011; 
Robinson et al., 2013).   
If induced apprehension leads to similar effects on selective attention as seen in trait 
anxious individuals, as according to models such as Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 
2007), increased attentional capture should be found within the threat condition as indexed by 
increased reaction times when distractor color singleton objects are present. If alternatively 
findings of reduced response-competition under acute anxiety and apprehension also translate 
to other measures of distractor processing, as proposed by a reduced cue utilization account 







Forty-six participants took part in the study. Of these, four participants’ data were 
excluded as outliers over 2.5 SDs from the sample: one due to raw RT, one due to error rates, 
and two for extreme distractor capture effects regardless of condition in the task. The final 
sample was therefore N = 42 (M age = 24 years, SD = 6; 17 male; 3 left-handed). Desired sample 
size was based on power analysis from data in a pilot study, with power of .80 to detect a 
moderate effect size of dz > .45.  
 
Stimuli and Procedures 
 The experiment was programmed and run using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.). Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor (60Hz; 1280 x 1024 screen 
resolution), with viewing distance at ~60cm. Responses in the task were recorded via keyboard 
button presses. All stimuli were presented on a black background, with a grey fixation dot (0.10 
x 0.10 degrees of visual angle) presented constantly throughout a block. An example 
experimental trial sequence is shown in Figure 1. On each trial, a search display was presented 
containing six colored shapes, a diamond and five circles (1.15 x 1.15°), positioned at six fixed 
circular points around fixation with an eccentricity of 2.24° as measured from the center of 
each object to fixation. On each trial, shapes could contain either a horizontal or vertical grey 
line (0.76 x 0.14°). On half of trials, all objects were the same color, either red (CIE coordinates: 
.587/.320) or green (.283/.573). On the other half of trials, one circle object appeared as a 
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salient distractor in the opposite color to the rest of the objects. The distractor stimulus was 
always presented in the opposite lateral hemifield to the diamond target, and was never 
directly adjacent or vertically/horizontally aligned from the target’s position in the circular 
array. Colors were equated for luminance (35 cd/m2).  
 Noise stimuli consisted of 23 possible sound files presented over headphones, all 
measured using a sound meter to play at 95-100 decibels. One of the sounds was a short burst 
of white noise, while the remainder were selected from the International Affective Digital 
Sounds (IADS) database on the basis of high ratings for arousal and unpleasantness2. Files were 
cropped to 600ms duration to reduce context. For example, a sound of a car skidding and 
crashing was cropped to only the crashing sound, while the sound of a violent altercation was 
cropped to only the sound of a shriek.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 On each trial, a search display was presented for 150ms followed by a 1850ms inter-trial 
interval that also acted as part of the 2000ms response window. The first trial in each block was 
preceded by a 1000ms interval. Participants were instructed on each trial to locate the diamond 
object, responding to the orientation of the line bar within it by pressing ‘0’ for horizontal or ‘2’ 
for vertical on the numeric keypad with their right index and middle fingers, respectively. Speed 
                                                          
2 The sound files from the IADS database used were: 105(1), 105(2), 106, 134, 275, 276, 277, 310, 312, 319, 380, 
420, 422, 424, 600, 626, 709, 711, 712, 714, 719, 732.  
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and accuracy were equally emphasized. Participants were also told that, on some displays, one 
of the non-target objects could appear in a salient color, and that they should ignore this. 
Finally, participants were instructed that in some blocks the task would be completed as normal 
(safe condition), but in other blocks there was a low probability of loud noise being presented 
over headphones during the block (threat condition). This occurred on 12.5% of trials within 
threat blocks. Before initiating each safe block, participants were encouraged to remove the 
headphones so that there would be no apprehension of noise.  
During practice, participants were given examples of two of the sounds to ensure the 
volume was tolerable and that they were happy to proceed. Following this, they completed six 
experimental blocks of 48 trials each. Safe and threat conditions were alternated each block 
following an ABABAB format, with this order reversed for half of participants. Each block 
counterbalanced target location, target color, distractor presence, target line orientation, and, 
on distractor-absent trials, the exact position of the salient color distractor in the opposite 
hemifield relative to the target. Line orientations within non-target objects were randomly 
assigned with the provision that three of each orientation appeared within a single display3. 
Within the threat condition, noise trials were randomly selected independently to the 
counterbalanced target list, with the specific sound played at each occurrence also chosen 
randomly.  At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to rate the task on the 
following criteria: how anxious/nervous the threat of noise made them feel during the task, 
                                                          
3 Note that presenting other horizontal/vertical line objects could create motor conflict between target and non-
target items’ associated response. As this conflict was constant across the experimental task however, its effect 
should be independent to that of attentional capture by color singletons. It is possible though that interactions 
between types of conflict could occur and also in conjunction of the effect of threat anticipation.   
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how stressed, and how generally unpleasant the noise stimuli were. Participants gave ratings of 
1-3, where 1=not at all, 2=moderately so, and 3=very.   
 
RESULTS 
Reaction times: As our research question related to anticipation of aversive noise, we 
excluded trials from analysis where noise was actually presented. Because noise was presented 
following search displays effectively during the inter-trial interval before the next display, we 
also excluded trials immediately following noise within the same block to ensure any 
differences were not due to affecting preparation for the next search episode. Signal-to-noise 
ratios between conditions were equated, as a matched number of random trials within the safe 
condition were flagged for exclusion by the experimental software online during data 
acquisition. Remaining mean RT data from correct-response trials were entered into a 2x2 
repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with the factors Noise Condition (Safe, 
Threat) and Distractor Presence (Present, Absent). Analysis showed a significant main effect of 
Distractor Presence (F(1,41)=16.06, p<.001, ηp2=.28), with the presence of a color singleton 
distractor generally slowing target RTs (M=721 vs. 706ms). There was no significant main effect 
of Noise Condition (F(1,41)=1.11, p=.30) but, crucially, a significant two-way interaction 
(F(1,41)=9.12, p=.004, ηp2=.18). Analyzing Distractor Presence effects separately, this cost was 
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only marginal in the safe condition (M=714 vs. 706ms; diff=8ms; t(41)=1.84 p=.07), but reliably 
present in the threat condition (M=728 vs. 705ms; diff=23ms; t(41)=4.74, p<.001; see Figure 2)4.   
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Error rates: A matching analysis on error rate data showed a trend for a main effect of 
Distractor Presence (F(1,41)=1.92, p=.17, ηp2=.05) with more errors on distractor-present trials 
(M=8 vs. 7%), but no evidence for an effect of Noise Condition or interaction (F’s<1). Error rates 
were generally low (M=7%, SD=6). Assessing the relationship between RT and error rates 
showed that distractor costs on the basis of RT in the safe and threat conditions, as well as the 
difference between them, were not related to distractor costs in error rates (r’s<.16, p’s>.31). 
General mean RTs in the safe condition were also unrelated to error rates (r’s<.16, p’s>.30). For 
the threat condition, there was evidence that longer RTs correlated with more errors under 
both distractor-present and absent conditions (r’s>.337, p’s<.03).   
 Ratings scales: Overall, participants rated that the noise stimuli elicited low to moderate 
anxious/nervousness and stressfulness (Meds=1.79 & 1.90), while the sounds were generally 
rated as moderately unpleasant (Med=2.17). Responses for all three ratings positively 
                                                          
4 As color, specifically red, can hold implicit affective value related to danger (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 
2010), we assessed if this may have contributed to observed findings. An additional analysis including 
Distractor Color as a factor indeed showed an interaction with Distractor Presence (F(1,41)=6.54, p=.01,  
ηp2=.14), with larger distractor costs for red singletons (M diff=23 vs. 8ms). There was no significant two-
way (F<1) or three-way interaction with Noise Condition (F(1,41)=1.52, p=.22), suggesting that 
heightened distractibility by red singletons was unrelated to increased distractibility found in the threat 
condition. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
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correlated (r’s>.569, N=42, p’s<.001). Ratings were then assessed for correlations with 
distractor costs. There was no evidence that ratings correlated with distractibility within the 
safe (r’s<.10, p’s>.48) or threat conditions (r’s<.245, p’s>.12). Finally, calculating the difference 
between distractor costs in threat versus safe conditions (i.e., threat cost minus safe cost), 
there were trends for positive associations with anxiety (r=.264, N=42, p=.09) and 
unpleasantness ratings (r=.261, N=42, p=.095), but not stress (r=.218, N=42, p=.17).  No 
relationships were evident for error rates (r’s<±.227, p’s>.15).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The goal of the present study was to examine the effect of induced anxious 
apprehension on distractibility as measured by attentional capture. Previous investigations on 
the role of acute anxiety, apprehension, and stress have reported inconsistent findings of 
increased/decreased distractibility in selective attention tasks, which could be confounded by 
common measurement of distraction being based on response-competition effects. Here, using 
a more direct measure of attentional processing, we found that induced apprehension 
significantly increased distractibility by task-irrelevant singletons during visual search as 
measured by larger costs to reaction times when distractors were present versus absent. This 
suggests that apprehension of aversive stimuli has a disruptive effect on selective attention 




 Results contrast with previous studies suggesting that anxiety and negative emotionality 
allows for improved selectivity (e.g., Booth, in press; Chajut & Algom, 2003; Henderson et al., 
2012; Hu et al., 2012; Finucane, 2011). According to Easterbrook’s reduced cue utilization 
account, one would have predicted that participants reduce attention to task-irrelevant color 
inputs under threat anticipation and instead narrow processing to shape inputs. The fact we 
observed the opposite result cannot be easily accommodated by this account. Instead, results 
provide credence to the possibility that a dominant task-measure in previous studies, 
distractibility based on response-competition, might confound effects of acute anxiety and 
apprehension, and more generally stress, on selective attention. As outlined in our 
introduction, such procedures may affect post-perceptual factors such as interacting with 
motor control over prepotent responses, which may affected by situational anxiety in distinct 
ways to visual selective attention. Of course, this interpretation remains speculative: here we 
only examined selective attention when removing any possible role of response-competition. A 
key avenue for future research is to now investigate what factors might be modulated by acute 
anxious emotion under response-competition procedures. However, it is worth reiterating that 
other studies employing such measures have observed evidence of increased distractibility 
when participants are presented with or anticipate aversive stimulation, in line with the current 
study (Schoofs et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 2016). Thus, it remains unclear why studies using 
similar methods to examine selective attention have produced strikingly different results. 
 Another possible factor is the precise induction method used and what emotion is 
primed in participants. Here, we presented loud aversive sounds at low probability, and focused 
on selective attention in the absence of a direct threat but rather an apprehension for its 
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forthcoming presentation. While we observed trends particularly between how anxious 
participants reported they felt within noise blocks, and how unpleasant the noises were 
perceived in relation to increased distractibility within threat blocks, we cannot conclusively 
state that the key emotion driving our findings was acute anxiety. Rather, our findings reflect a 
role of anticipation of aversive threat stimuli on selective attention, and may not generalize, for 
instance, to situations of anxiety in the direct presence of a threat. This broader point on 
generalization however applies to previous studies, where induction techniques have variably 
induced different components of anxious and stressful emotion (e.g., Booth, in press; Choi et 
al., 2012; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). Nevertheless, a previous study by Moran and Moser 
(2015) did in fact measure the role of both trait anxiety and acute apprehension on attentional 
capture, where apprehension was induced by instructing some participants that they would be 
asked to deliver an impromptu speech in front of an evaluative audience following the 
experimental task. While the authors found that trait anxiety predicted increased attentional 
capture, no effect was seen under acute apprehension. In contrast, the present study induced 
apprehension transiently within experimental blocks, with potential noise occurring 
immediately following search displays and therefore temporally linked to the offset of displays. 
One could therefore argue that a role of apprehension on selective attention is detectable as a 
transiently-activated effect rather than experienced potently over a prolonged period of time. 
This could be examined by more precisely measuring the inter-trial variability in reaction times 
within blocks rather than simply mean RT as in the current study, which fails to fully 
encapsulate the underlying distribution of responses within and between participants, 
comparing this with, for instance, objective physiological measures of current apprehension 
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and other measures of attentional capture (e.g., overt eye-movements to distractor objects). 
However, even if the effects of apprehension on distractibility are transient, this still cannot 
fully reconcile differences seen in past studies where, for example, similar aversive shock 
anticipation methods were used by both Choi et al (2012) and Hu et al (2011) within Stroop-like 
tasks, with the former finding generally increased distraction under threat, and the latter 
reduced.  
 Finally, based on our findings, it is important to consider the attentional mechanisms 
underpinning distractor capture. Drawing parallels with evidence relating to the role of trait 
anxiety in attentional control (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007), one possibility is that acute 
apprehension reduces top-down suppression of salient color distractors such as via the role of 
worry in impairing executive attention processes. This is in line with proposals that singleton 
distractors can elicit an automatic “attend-to-me” signal during visual search, and individual 
differences in attentional control (e.g., inferred from working memory capacity) predict 
whether or not distractors elicit capture or instead evidence of active suppression (e.g., Gaspar 
et al., 2016; Sawaki & Luck, 2010). Models of anxiety such as Attentional Control Theory 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) posit a similar process, where anxiety disrupts top-down inhibition, 
resulting in increased bottom-up or saliency-driven attentional capture processes. Alternatively 
though, it is possible that apprehension primarily only enhances saliency-driven processes, 
making it more likely for attention to be allocated to salient distractors, while not necessarily 
disrupting active suppression mechanisms. Gaspar and McDonald (2018) recently delineated 
these two possibilities in an event-related potential (ERP) study of attentional capture in high 
trait anxious individuals. They examined two ERP components, the N2pc and PD, which are 
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believed to reflect the allocation of attention to objects in visual space and the suppression of 
attentional allocation, respectively. They found that while both low and high anxious individuals 
showed a reliable PD component in response to irrelevant color singletons, only high anxious 
individuals showed a preceding significant N2pc component to such objects. This could suggest 
that increased distractibility observed in high anxious individuals may primarily reflect 
enhanced saliency-driven capture, while having little effect on top-down suppression (though 
see Gaspar & McDonald, 2018, who note an alternative possible role of impaired proactive 
control in top-down filtering). Future research dissociating these two factors with regards to 
the role of induced apprehension would allow assessment of whether similar mechanisms as 
observed in trait anxiety underlie the increased distractibility found in the present study. 
Moreover, how acute experience of apprehension may interact with trait levels of anxiety, or 
one’s general attentional control ability, is also of interest to discern whether situational factors 
may interact with one’s disposition to modulate selective attention.  
 In summary, the present study suggests that acute apprehension of aversive stimuli 
increases an observer’s propensity to task-irrelevant attentional capture. Considering 
complementary findings reported among high trait anxious individuals, our results indicate a 
generalized role of anxiety-related emotion in increasing task-irrelevant distraction. 
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Figure 1: Example experimental trial display within the threat condition (not to scale). On each 
search display, participants saw six colored shapes, a diamond acting as the target and five non-
target circles. Participants responded whether the line inside the diamond on each display was 
horizontally or vertically oriented. On half of trials, all shapes appeared in the same color, either 
red or green (distractor-absent). On other trials, one of the circle objects appeared in the 
opposite color to its neighbors (distractor-present). Participants were instructed to ignore any 
odd color item and respond to the diamond object as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Within the threat condition, at the offset of search displays, there was a 12.5% probability that 
a loud aversive sound would be presented over headphones for 600ms. Such trials were 
discarded from analysis – only trials where noise was anticipated were examined. Within the 
safe condition, the task was completed without any possible noise being presented.  
 
Figure 2: (Left panel) Mean reaction times within safe and threat conditions, shown separately 
for distractor-present (dark gray) and distractor-absent trials (light gray). Error bars denote +/- 
1 SE. (Right panel) Distractor presence costs, calculated as distractor-present minus absent RT, 
within the two conditions.  
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